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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-LAWYER ADVERTISING-
RESTRICTIONS MUST BE NARROWLY DRAWN To SERVE SUBSTAN-
TIAL STATE INTEREST. In re R.M ., 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
R.M.J., an attorney, placed advertisements' in local newspapers
and the yellow pages of the local telephone directory, which con-
tained information other than that specifically permitted by Disci-
plinary Rule 2-101(B) of Rule 4 of the Missouri Supreme Court.2
i. The advertisements contained a statement that the attorney was licensed to practice
in Illinois and Missouri, and before the Supreme Court of the United States. He stated as
areas of practice: Corporations, Partnerships, Tax, Securities-Bonds, Pensions-Profit Shar-
ing, Trials & Appeals, Criminal, Real Estate, Wills, Estate Planning, Probate, Bankruptcy,
Personal Injury, Divorce, Separation, Custody, Adoption, Workman's Compensation, and
Contracts. In his advertisement in the telephone directory he added the categories of Anti-
Trust and Labor. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 940 (1982).
2. Missouri Rule DR 2-101(B) reads as follows:
In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential
consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish, subject to DR 2-103, the follow-
ing information in newspapers, periodicals, and the yellow pages of telephone di-
rectories distributed in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or
maintains offices or in which a substantial part of the lawyer's clientele resides,
provided that the information disclosed by the lawyer in such publication complies
with DR 2-101(A), and is presented in a dignified manner:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates; ad-
dresses and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more particular areas or fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm
practices if authorized by and using designations and definitions authorized
for that purpose by The Advisory Committee;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Schools attended, with dates of graduation and degrees;
(5) Foreign language ability;
(6) Office hours;
(7) Fee for an initial 30-minute consultation;
(8) Availability upon request of a schedule of fees;
(9) Credit arrangements for payment of fees will be given consideration;
(10) The fixed fee to be charged for the following specific routine legal services:
1. An uncontested dissolution of marriage;
2. An uncontested adoption;
3. An uncontested personal bankruptcy;
4. An uncomplicated change of name;
5. A simple-warranty or quitclaim deed;
6. A simple deed of trust;
7. A simple promissory note;
8. An individual Missouri or federal income tax return;
9. A simple power of attorney;
10. A simple will;
11. Such other services as may be approved by The Advisory Committee;
the description of which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive, pro-
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He also sent a card to selected persons announcing the opening of
his office, in violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-102 of Rule 4. As a
result, the Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court of Missouri
charged the attorney with unprofessional conduct.3
in the subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court
of Missouri upheld the constitutionality of the advertising restric-
tions, justifying its finding on the fact that an in-depth constitutional
study of Disciplinary Rule 2-101 was performed before it was
adopted.4 R.M.J.. appealed the private reprimand to the United
States Supreme Court, claiming that the restrictions on advertising
were unconstitutional under the first5 and fourteenth 6 amendments
to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed and
held that the restrictions did infringe the first amendment rights of
R.M.J. In re R.M.J, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
In re R.MJ involved two legal doctrines, the traditional prohi-
bition on attorney advertising and the commercial speech doctrine.7
vided that the statement discloses that the quoted fee will be available only
to clients whose matters fall into the services described and that the client is
entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of the fee likely to be
charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in setting
forth the fee information.
In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412-13 (Mo. 1980).
The areas of the law permitted by the Advisory Committee under Missouri DR 2-
101(B)(2) were: Administrative Law, Anti-Trust Law, Appellate Practice, Bankruptcy,
Commercial Law, Corporation Law and Business Organizations, Criminal Law, Eminent
Domain Law, Environmental Law, Family Law, Financial Institution Law, Insurance Law,
Labor Law, Local Government Law, Military Law, Probate and Trust Law, Property Law,
Public Utility Law, Taxation Law, Tort Law, Trial Practice, and Workers' Compensation
Law. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 933 n.6 (1982).
3. The four grounds were: (1) he published advertisements in which he listed areas of
practice in words other than those permitted by the Advisory Committee, (2) he failed to
include a required disclaimer in conjunction with his listing of areas of practice, (3) he listed
the courts before which he was authorized to practice, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, and (4) he mailed announcement cards to persons other than lawyers, clients,
friends, and relatives. 102 S. Ct. at 934.
4. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980). The court did not mention the use of the
announcement cards or the lack of a disclaimer in its opinion.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ....
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States ...."
7. The commercial speech doctrine was the rule that "[s]peech that was categorized as
commercial' in nature (i.e. speech that advertised a product or service for profit or for busi-
ness purpose) was formerly not afforded First Amendment freedom of speech protection,
and as such could be freely regulated by statutes and ordinances." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 245 (5th ed. 1979).
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These two principles clashed prior to R.M.J in Bales v. State Bar of
Arizona,8 in which lawyer advertising was held to be constitution-
ally protected speech. Bates overturned the absolute ban which the
rules of professional responsibility had placed on attorney
advertising.
The pre-Bates prohibition on attorney advertising began not as
a rule of ethics but as a rule of etiquette. 9 It developed into a rule of
ethics in America near the turn of the century. In People ex rel
Attorney General v. MacCabe" the Colorado Supreme Court stated
that "[t]he ethics of the legal profession forbid that an attorney
should advertise his talents or his skills as a shopkeeper advertises
his wares."' The publication of simple business cards 12 was at one
time permissible, 13 but even this kind of advertising fell into disfa-
vor. 14 It soon became established that any published advertising by
attorneys was unprofessional.' 5 Strict prohibition was the rule until
8. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
9. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210-11 (1953).
10. 18 Colo. 186, 32 P. 280 (1893).
11. Id. at 188, 32 P. at 280. The court in this case dealt with several issues raised by
MacCabe's advertisement. The major concern was that he was advertising for clients inter-
ested in procuring a divorce. Some states passed statutes prohibiting divorce advertising,
and the issue of promoting divorce, rather than lawyer advertising per se, became a major
focus in many opinions. Eg., Mayer v. State Bar of California, 2 Cal. 2d 71, 39 P.2d 206
(1934) (violation of statute); In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495 (1928) (violation of
statute); State v. Giantvalley, 123 Minn. 227, 143 N.W. 780 (1913) (in which the court dealt
only with violation of a statute, and did not mention the ethics issue); In re Tall, 339 Mo. 1I,
93 S.W.2d 922 (1936); In re Scoular, 34 Nev. 313, 123 P. 13 (1912) (in which the court
mentioned a new statute prohibiting advertising for divorce); In re Schnitzer, 33 Nev. 581,
112 P. 848 (1911). A general discussion of the prohibition on lawyer advertising can be
found at ANNOT., 39 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1955).
12. "A published note, containing a short statement, request, explanation, or the like."
2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 111 (1933).
13. "The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of
personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper." Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics, Canon 27 (1908), reprinted in H. DRINKER, supra note 9, at 316-
17 n.6. Similarly in People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Berezniak, 292 111. 305, 127 N.E. 36
(1920), an attorney was disciplined for his flamboyant advertisements designed to attract
show business clientele. The court stated in dicta that publication of a simple card, giving
limited information, was not improper. The advertisements involved in this case could not
possibly fit the description of a simple card.
14. Canon 27 was amended in 1937 to no longer permit publication of business cards.
H. DRINKER, supra note 9, at 316-17 n.6.
15. "No infringement of the canons, other than those involving sheer dishonesty, have
called forth stronger judicial and professional denunciation than violations of Canon 27
prohibiting advertising and soliciting." In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 549, 97 A.2d 621, 632
(1953). "[I]t is not now debatable that any form of advertising is improper... and the only
possible question is whether the matter complained of constitutes advertising." In re Anon-
ymous, 32 A.D.2d 37, 39, 299 N.Y.S.2d 240, 243 (1969). Canon 27 in its amended form
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the landmark case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 16
The commercial speech doctrine evolved from Valentine v.
Chrestensen.17 In Chrestensen, the plaintiff was informed by the Po-
lice Commissioner of New York City that he could not distribute
handbills advertising the public display of his submarine for profit.
Chrestensen then printed a handbill which contained his advertise-
ment on one side and a protest against the New York ordinance on
the other. He sued to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance after be-
ing arrested for distributing the double-faced handbill. The police
informed him that the protest alone could be distributed, but the
advertisement could not. The Supreme Court held that the Consti-
tution did not limit the state's power to regulate purely commercial
advertising.' s In this short opinion, the Supreme Court distin-
guished commercial speech from other kinds of speech and brought
the commercial speech doctrine into being.
Chrestensen stood for the proposition that the Constitution did
not protect commercial speech. Doubts about the validity and scope
of the decision soon arose.' 9 The holding in Chrestensen was not
extended to every case in which someone made a profit from the
communication. In later cases the Court distinguished the distribu-
tion of religious papers,20 movies,2 and books.22 Even the fact that
advertisements were sold did not make their contents unprotected
prohibited all publication except in approved law lists. Solicitation of professional employ-
ment by advertisements was forbidden. The strict prohibition was continued in the Ameri-
can Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1969).
16. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
17. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
18. Id. at 54. The Court stated:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise
of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that,
though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the
public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these
public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
19. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) in
which Justice Douglas stated, "Valentine v. Chrestensen . . . held that business advertise-
ments and commercial matters did not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. The ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it
has not survived reflection." Id. at 513-14. Justice Douglas also expressed his view that
Chrestensen was incorrect in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove Trustee, 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
20. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943).
21. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
22. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
commercial speech;23 however, advertisements which proposed ille-
gal transactions could be banned. 4
In Bigelow v. Virginia25 the Supreme Court limited the holding
of Chrestensen to a regulation of the manner of commercial adver-
tising.26 The decision in Bigelow, however, did not put an end to the
old commercial speech doctrine, because the advertisement in Bige-
low was political as well as commercial in nature. 7 It was not until
the Court decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc .21 that the old commercial speech doc-
trine was finally put to rest. In that case the Court held that the
State of Virginia could not constitutionally prohibit pharmacies
from advertising prescription drugs.29 Unlike the advertisement in
Bigelow, the idea expressed in the Virginia Pharmacy advertisement
was totally commercial.30 The Court ruled that purely commercial
speech was protected by the Constitution.3' The final footnote in
Virginia Pharmacy reserved the question of advertising by other
professionals. It indicated that other professionals render services,
as opposed to products, and therefore different factors must be
considered.32
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Virginia Pharmacy
foreshadowed Bates. Justice Burger in his concurring opinion dis-
tinguished the situation of attorneys and physicians from that of
pharmacists. 33 He pointed out that attorneys and physicians pro-
vide services in which professional judgment is a large component,
and thus their services are distinguishable from the retail sale of
drugs.34 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist expressed the belief that
the decision had far wider significance than the rest of the Court
23. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
25. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
26. Id. at 819-20. The Court discussed Chrestensen as follows:
But the holding is distinctly a limited one; the ordinance was upheld as a reason-
able regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distrib-
uted. The fact that it had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not mean
that Chrestensen is authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating com-
mercial advertising are immune from constitutional challenge. The case obviously
does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.
27. Id. at 822.
28. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
29. Id. at 770.
30. Id. at 760.
31. Id. at 770.
32. Id. at 773, n.25.
33. Id. at 774-75 (Burger, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 774.
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recognized. 35 He felt that the rule adopted by the Court would nec-
essarily extend to the medical, legal, and other professions.36
In Bates v. State Bar ofArizona 37 the Virginia Pharmacy version
of the commercial speech doctrine was applied to the traditional
prohibition on attorney advertising. The Supreme Court held that
two attorneys who printed an advertisement containing their names,
addresses, and the prices charged for routine legal services could not
be disciplined for their action.38 The Court in Bates recognized that
lawyer advertising could be limited and regulated, but the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising was not constitutional.39
Anticipating the Bates decision, the American Bar Association
(ABA) created a Task Force on Lawyer Advertising.40 The Task
Force reported to the ABA Board of Governors and presented two
proposed versions of the rule governing lawyer advertising.41 Pro-
posal A was the more restrictive. It specified what attorneys could
say in their advertisements.42 Proposal B set out specific restrictions
on what attorneys could not say in their advertisements.43 The ABA
House of Delegates adopted Proposal A," but it also authorized dis-
tribution of Proposal B to the highest state appellate courts. 5
The reported decisions and rule changes following Bates indi-
cated that many issues remained unresolved. Some states imposed
strict limits on lawyer advertising.' Even advertisements similar to
the one in Bates were prohibited in some jurisdictions.4 7 There also
35. Id. at 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 783.
37. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
38. Id. at 382.
39. Id. at 383-84. (The Court mentioned several permissible limits on advertising. Mis-
leading advertisement may be prohibited. Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
may be imposed. Advertising concerning illegal transactions may be prohibited.)
40. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 28
(1979).
41. Report 177B of Board of Governors, American Bar Association (1978), reprinted in
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITrEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS [hereinafter cited as Report 177B.].
42. Id. at 6. Proposal A is set out in full, at pages 11-30 of Report 177B.
43. Id at 7. Proposal B is set out in full, at pages 31-47 of Report 177B.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id.
46. Eg., Provisional Order No. 11, 382 A.2d 194, modified, 409 A.2d 1226 (R.I. 1979);
In re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.w.2d 638 (Tenn.
1978) (rule forbade advertising areas of practice).
47. E.g., Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct, 521 F. Supp. 1219
(S.D. Iowa 1981) (The district court upheld an Iowa restriction on the use of logos, holding
that although there was a logo in the advertisement in Bates, the logo was apparently not
raised as an issue in the case.); Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 481 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ala.
[Vol. 5:457
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remained a question of what would be "misleading" in an attorney's
advertisement.48
While the state courts and lower federal courts were interpret-
ing Bates, the United States Supreme Court was developing a new
commercial speech doctrine. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Associa-
lion4 9 the Court held that the protection of Bates did not extend to
in-person solicitation by an attorney for personal gain.5 0 In a com-
panion case the Court held that an attorney who sent a letter to an
individual offering free representation on behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union, with the purpose of furthering political and
social concerns, could not be disciplined for solicitation of clients .5
Similarly, the Court allowed the State of Texas to prohibit optome-
trists from practicing under a trade name in view of actual abuses. 2
Finally, the Court pulled together all the commercial speech cases
since Virginia Pharmacy and promulgated a new commercial speech
doctrine in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission." In Central Hudson Gas the Court developed a four-
part test for determining whether a state's action infringes the right
to commercial speech. It recognized the distinction between com-
mercial speech and other varieties of speech, and that commercial
1979), rev'don other grounds, 648 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981) (The plaintiffs sought an injunc-
tion against enforcement of an Alabama disciplinary rule which would have prevented them
from using the name "Legal Clinic" in their advertisements. The term "Legal Clinic" ap-
peared in the Bates advertisement. The district court granted summary judgment but the
court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial).
48. Some courts prohibited advertising areas of practice unless accompanied by a price.
The courts theorized that listing an area of practice without a price would lead the public to
believe that the attorney was an expert in the area listed. Rhode Island promulgated such a
prohibition in Provisional Order No. 11, 382 A.2d 194, modified, 409 A.2d 1226 (R.I. 1979).
In Carter v. Lovett and Linder, Ltd., 425 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1981), the Rhode Island Supreme
Court enforced this provision, and the constitutionality of the limitation was upheld in
Lovett and Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.I. 1981). The Tennessee Supreme
Court also adopted this reasoning in In re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer
Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. 1978). This limitation was later struck down in Durham
v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
The Arkansas Supreme Court dealt with what it thought to be a misleading advertise-
ment in Eaton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas Committee on Professional Conduct, 270 Ark.
573, 607 S.w.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981). The court held that an adver-
tisement which offered a first appointment with "no time or subject limitation" and ended a
series of questions about whether the reader had specific legal problems with the question
"Other legal problems?" could give the impression that the attorneys were competent to
consult and advise on any legal problem.
49. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
50. Id. at 466.
51. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
52. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
53. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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speech is afforded limited protection under the Constitution. 4 The
Court stated:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has
developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expres-
sion is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest. 55
In In re R.MJ 56 the Supreme Court of the United States ap-
plied the four-part test announced in Central Hudson Gas to the re-
strictions placed on attorney advertising under the Missouri Rule.57
The information charged R.M.J. with four violations of the Rule,
three of which were before the Supreme Court:5 (1) listing areas of
practice in words other than those permitted by the Advisory Com-
mittee of the Missouri Supreme Court, (2) listing the jurisdictions
and courts before which he was admitted to practice, and (3) mail-
ing announcement cards to persons other than lawyers, clients,
friends, and relatives. 9 The Court held that each of these restric-
tions was an impermissible limitation on R.M.J.'s constitutional
rights. 60
Applying the Central Hudson Gas test to the first violation, the
Court agreed with Chief Justice Bardgett's dissent from the Missouri
Supreme Court that the words chosen by R.M.J. were less mislead-
54. Id. at 562-63.
55. Id. at 566.
56. 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
57. Id. at 938.
58. The violation not before the Supreme Court was R.M.J.'s failure to include a re-
quired disclaimer of certification. Id. at 938 n. 18. In the Missouri Supreme Court decision,
Judge Seiler's dissent noted that R.M.J. did not have notice of the disclaimer requirement
until it was too late for him to have it included in one of the newspaper advertisements and
in the telephone directory, and that the other newspaper advertisement, published after
R.M.J. had notice of the requirement, contained the disclaimer. Judge Seiler also pointed
out that judging from the yellow pages in the telephone directories of Kansas City and St.
Louis, numerous attorneys were unaware of the requirement. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411,
415 (Mo. 1980) (Seiler, J., dissenting).
59. 102 S. Ct. at 938.
60. Id. at 939.
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ing than those prescribed by the Advisory Committee.6 ' Since the
Advisory Committee did not argue that any substantial interest was
promoted by the first restriction, 62 the Court concluded that this
portion of the rule was an invalid restriction on speech as applied in
this case.63
The Court held with regard to the second violation that the in-
formation that R.M.J. was licensed to practice in both Illinois and
Missouri was not misleading on its face, and in light of the location
in which R.M.J. practiced, the information was highly relevant.64
The Advisory Committee had failed to identify any substantial state
interest in prohibiting a lawyer from advertising the jurisdictions in
which he is licensed to practice. 65 Although the Court was disturbed
by the fact that R.M.J. advertised that he was admitted to practice
before the Supreme Court of the United States, it held that there
was nothing to indicate that the information was misleading. 66
With regard to the third violation, the Court stated there was
nothing in the record to indicate why the rule restricted direct mail-
ing of the announcement cards.67 Looking to the fourth part of the
Central Hudson Gas test, the Court reasoned that there were cer-
tainly less restrictive ways available to prevent abuse than total pro-
hibition, such as requiring a filing of all copies of general mailings.68
A significant factor in the decision was the failure of the Advi-
sory Committee and the Missouri Supreme Court to apply the test
of Central Hudson Gas to their restrictions on lawyer advertising.69
For this reason, the first question of the test, whether the advertise-
ment was misleading, was never raised by the Advisory Commit-
tee. 70 The United States Supreme Court, however, elaborated on
61. Id. at 938. The Advisory Committee did not argue that the terms used were mis-
leading. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 939.
67. Id.
68. Id. at n. 19. The Court gave as an example the solution of the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(b) (Proposed Final Draft, 1981). That rule requires an
attorney to keep a copy of any written communication for one year after it is sent.
69. 102 S. Ct. at 938-39. The Missouri Supreme Court explicitly refused to apply the
test, stating, "We are urged now by respondent to follow the Central Hudson model. We
respectfully decline to enter the thicket of attempting to anticipate and to satisfy the subjec-
tive adhoc judgments of a majority of the justices of the United States Supreme Court." In
re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1980) (emphasis in original).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 938-39.
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this issue stating:
[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising sug-
gests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has
proven that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the states
may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may
be prohibited entirely. But the states may not place an absolute
prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading informa-
tion, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also
may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.7'
Another significant factor was the failure of the Advisory Commit-
tee to assert any substantial state interest which might justify any of
the limitations.72
In re R.MJ leaves two questions unanswered. The first is what
constitutes a misleading advertisement in the field of legal advertis-
ing. The preferable rule would be one which is designed to prohibit
only those statements which are likely to mislead a layperson and to
otherwise allow maximum freedom of expression in advertisements.
The second question is what state interests are substantial enough to
prohibit inclusion of non-misleading statements in advertisements.
Once an interest is found to be substantial, further questions will
arise: whether the specific limitation is narrow enough, and whether
it directly advances the substantial state interest.
The major significance of R.M.J is that it applies the new com-
mercial speech doctrine of Central Hudson Gas to professional ad-
vertising. If the information is not misleading and does not deal
with illegal activity, any restriction on advertising of the information
must be designed to narrowly and directly advance a substantial
government interest. This is the new test which all restrictions on
commercial speech must meet.
The decision probably invalidates the rules of professional re-
sponsibility dealing with lawyer advertising in many states.73 The
approach of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,74
adopted by Arkansas, 75 is to list that information that may be in-
71. Id. at 937.
72. Id. at 939. In the area of direct mailings, the United States Supreme Court itself
supplied a possible substantial state interest in restricting direct mailings. As mentioned
above, the Court overturned the restriction on the ground it was over-extensive. Id.
73. Young, Supreme Court Report, 68 A.B.A. J. 342 (1982).
74. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1981).
75. Rules of the Court Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law, 260 Ark.
910 (1976) (per curiam), amended, 263 Ark. 948 (1978). The Arkansas version of DR 2-
101(A) and (B) reads as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other
466 [Vol. 5:457
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cluded in an advertisement and forbid the use of any other informa-
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any
form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, de-
ceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential
consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR
2-103, the following information in the geographic area or areas in which the
lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of the law-
yer's clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed by the lawyer
in such publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A).
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associ-
ates; addresses and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices or a
statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of
law practice, to the extent authorized under DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other scholas-
tic distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching positions;
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations and
societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer
participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or an esti-
mate of the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided that the state-
ment discloses whether percentages are computed before or after de-
duction of costs; and that the client is responsible for the costs
regardless of the outcome of the litigation;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that
the specific fee within the range which will be charged will vary de-
pending upon the particular matter to be handled for each client and
the client is entitled without obligation to an estimate of the fee within
the range likely to be charged, in print size equivalent to the largest
print used in setting forth fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee
charged will depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted
to the particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is
entitled to without obligation an estimate of the fee likely to be
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tion.7 6  Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A) prohibits the use of "false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair" adver-
tisements.77 Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) allows the publication of
twenty-five categories of information.78  This is the scheme of the
regulation struck down in R.M.J 9 The portion of the rule prohibit-
ing deceptive and misleading advertisements 80 will stand under
AM.J It will be impossible, however, for a state to defend the rest
of the rule on the ground that any information not permitted by the
rule is inherently and incurably deceptive, 81 as the relevance and
clarity of advertisement of any information depends on the circum-
stances.82 It is equally difficult to imagine a substantial state interest
which could be narrowly and directly furthered by a blanket prohi-
bition on advertisement of any information not permitted by the
rule.83
There are two proposed alternatives to the ABA rule. One is
Proposal B of the ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising which
was rejected by the House of Delegates.84 The other is the proposal
charged, in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in
setting forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, which must be accompanied by a
description of the services which shall not be misleading or deceptive,
provided that the statement discloses that the quoted fee will be avail-
able only to clients whose matters fall into the services described and
that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of the
fee likely to be charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest
print used in setting forth the fee information.
Robinson, The Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 ARK. L. REV. 605, 657-59-
(1980) (footnotes omitted).
76. Report I77B, supra note 41, at 6.
77. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (1981).
78. Id. DR 2-101(B).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 933.
80. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (1981).
81. This would seem to be the requirement. 102 S. Ct. at 937.
82. For an example of non-misleading information not specifically authorized by an
ABA Code style disciplinary rule, see Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics and Con-
duct, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981). In Bishop an attorney successfully challenged a
state rule which prohibited him from mentioning his race in advertisements. Note also that
in AM..J the United States Supreme Court held that in view of the area in which R.M.J.
practiced, the information placed in his advertisement that he was licensed in both Illinois
and Missouri was highly relevant. 102 S. Ct. at 938.
83. Such a prohibition could not meet the fourth requirement of the Central Hudson
Gas test. It would be more extensive than necessary to serve any substantial government
interest, and would not qualify as "carefully drawn," as required by RMZJ, 102 S. Ct. at
939.
84. Report 177B, supra note 41, at 31-47. This rule was adopted by Florida and is re-
produced in The Florida Bar re Amendment to Florida Bar Code, 380 So. 2d 435, 438-42
(Fla. 1980).
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of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 5 Proposal B prohibits
misleading advertising in Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A). 8 6 Discipli-
nary Rule 2-101(B) defines what constitutes a misleading advertise-
ment 87 while Disciplinary Rule 2-101(C) prohibits mention of other
such matters as would be inappropriate or unfair in an attorney's
advertisement. 88 The Proposed Model Rules are more permissive
than either the present ABA Code or Proposal B. Rule 7.1 prohibits
85. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
86. Report 177B, supra note 41, at 37. "A lawyer shall not on behalf of himself, his
partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in
the use of any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, or
deceptive statement or claim."
87. Report 177B, supra note 41, at 37-38. It reads as follows:
Without limitation a false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or claim
includes a statement or claim which:
(1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact;
(2) Omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statement, in the light
of all circumstances, not misleading;
(3) Is intended or is likely to create an unjustified expectation;
(4) States or implies that a lawyer is a certified or recognized specialist other than
as permitted by DR 2-105;
(5) Is intended or is likely to convey the impression that the lawyer is in a posi-
tion to influence improperly any court, tribunal, or other public body or
official;
(6) Relates to legal fees other than:
(a) A statement of the fee for initial consultation;
(b) A statement of the fixed or contingent fee charged for a specific legal
service, the description of which would not be misunderstood or be
deceptive;
(c) A statement of the range of fees for specifically described legal services,
provided there is a reasonable disclosure of all relevant variables and
considerations so that the statement would not be misunderstood or be
deceptive;
(d) A statement of specified hourly rates, provided the statement makes
clear that the total charge will vary according to the number of hours
devoted to the matter;
(e) The availability of credit arrangements; and
(f) A statement of the fees charged by a qualified legal assistance organiza-
tion in which he participates for specific legal services the description of
which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive; or
(7) Contains a representation or implication that is likely to cause an ordinary
prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived or fails to contain reasonable
warnings or disclaimers necessary to make a representation or implication not
deceptive.
88. Report 177B, supra note 41, at 39. It reads as follows:
A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of
public communication which:
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making any misleading communication concerning a lawyer's serv-
ices and describes what constitutes a false or misleading statement.89
This rule applies both to advertisements and such direct personal
contact with potential clients as the Model Rules permit.90 Rule 7.2provides a straightforward general rule permitting lawyer advertis-
ing.9' In general, the Model Rules forbid misleading advertising but
do not try to restrict advertising for any other reason. Because of its
permissive approach to advertising and its broad recognition of the
(1) Is intended or is likely to result in a legal action or a legal position being
asserted merely to harass or maliciously injure another;
(2) Contains statistical data or other information based on past performance or
prediction of future success;
(3) Contains a testimonial about or endorsement of a lawyer;
(4) Contains a statements [sic] of opinion as to the quality of the services or con-
tains a representation or implication regarding the quality of legal services
which is not susceptible of reasonable verification by the public;
(5) Appeals primarily to a layperson's fear, greed, desire for revenge, or similar
emotion; or
(6) Is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showmanship, puffery, self-
laudation or hucksterism, including the use of slogans, jingles or garish or
sensational language or format; or
(7) Utilizes television until [the agency having jurisdiction under state law] shall
have determined that use of such media is necessary in light of the existing
provisions of the Code, accords with standards of accuracy, reliability and
truthfulness, and would facilitate the process of informed selection of lawyers
by potential customers of legal services.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
It reads as follows:
A lawyer shall not make any false or misleading communication about the lawyer
or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary
to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that
violate the rules of professional conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the com-
parison can be factually substantiated.
90. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 comment (Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
It reads -as follows:
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3(b), a lawyer may advertise
services through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory,
newspaper or other periodical, radio or television, or through written commu-
nication not involving personal contact.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be
kept for one year after its dissemination.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the
lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of adver-
tising or written communication permitted by this Rule.
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attorney's first amendment rights, the Model Rules' approach is in
tune with the spirit of the Supreme Court's recent rulings on lawyer
advertising and commercial speech.
James Gerard Schulze

